

The Imm. Concept, and the Archetype of Christum ^①
Purpose of Incarn. (de facto): Man's self-redemption.
Causa sui.

8 Dec. 1954 Duplication: by divine Person in human nature.

By coop. of human person in work
of his. Redemption.

Mary, one with Christ, in univ. way.

① In order of nature: in assimilation
of personation: God the Son proceeds
as image of Mary.
Grace of union, grace of unity.
Euharistic order.

Natural basis of friendship between
divine Person and human person.

Natural basis of participation in
X's Person. Lovingful compassion

② In the order of grace:

X's habitual grace follows grace of union
'as a natural property.' Hence place
of hypostatic order.

Mary's grace proportioned to motherhood:
'dignum habitum propter':
conatural.

Union of grace most intimate. Perfect,
with regard to life proper to Godhead,
natural union of Mother & Son.

Both have habitual grace 'personal'
in a less redundant. Both universal
causes.

Only Godhead principal cause of grace. ②
X's humanity, only instrumental, but
rational and free. Godhead not instr.
cause. Best person of Mary instrumental
cause.

Both Person, humanity, and Mary, series.
causes.

Quid tunc. concise? One → many, simul.
: Principal and instrumental attain same effect.

Difficulty: The mediator, The offering.

As to grace: X as much as can be had
Mary " " her role requires.

Ex gratia: { praeservativ. } both from X.
 { reparativ. }

Mary, " sublimiori modo eximpta?"

Applic. of Univ. causal.

Univ. cause not divided by mult. eff.

God causa totius orbis

Angls, natural, Univ. cause, inst.

God in ratione causae universalis.

CP III 70.

X's humanity Univ. instr. cause: proper
effect: praeserv. & reparativ.

Mary, dependently on X, → reparativ.

Gen. 7: Bonum diffus. sui. (Cf. Gallup)

Epist.: Nobility of friendship.

Philos. IX, 8, 1169a15

Hence greater friendship in us.

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- Raises some very old questions - calling to mind Job & Ecclesiastes.
The things that are not of our choosing:
Existence. No choice. Besides, largely due to chance. No such essence
in nature. Chance meeting.
Kind of person we are.
- Characteristic notes: physical and mental, with us per se.
- Time, place.
Human milieu: parents; their fortune; social milieu.
Education.
Our place. Uncertainty of our days, ^{Contingency.} threat of death, ^{Testing on edge of nothingness.} Natural, yet.
- Our objective being { In mind & feel
of angels
in ourselves
in mind of neighbor. Usually, we live for this "true one in
opinion of humankind."
- Actually, stranger to ourselves { to neighbor
to selves too.
- Christian reply: Faith - in God's Providence: our nature & contingency.
Elision to { Hope - in His goodness: uncertainty regarding what now and then
Not... { Charity - by which we are as we should be. Measure of future
consequences
- Means to this: Render service to God - Religion. Factors obedience. Not
sheer resignation, but active will. It's passion.
- No other practical answer: Love God & neighbor.

In view of this, the distinction between geometry and arithmetic could be defined as 'when one fails to see that they should really ^{be} the same'. That geometry is worthless unless it can have the rigour of arithmetic which is not really rigorous either.

If we assume that the continuum is as rational as the discrete, plainly geometry cannot have the rigour of arithmetic.

all numbers have the
same qualitative status.

F

The definition of circle allows for any number of individual circles. But the individual circle we actually consider is like the man Socrates we actually consider. The universal 'man' does not actually contain 'all men'....

Nothing individual.
Interesting about this
circle except inasmuch as
I am now using it to
demonstrate

This individual cannot be 'like' 'man' in the sense that he is like to that other individual. This circle is not like circle as it is like to that other circle. To define a thing, like the number two, by the likeness of couples..... kind of strange.

Similia 'one in quality'.

Aequalia 'one in quantity'.

The root of selfishness.

~~the~~ The two kinds
of love of self; as Aristotle
distinguishes them in
the Ethics. What is it
that drives the person to
self-exaltation? Why it
is that the ~~greatest~~ pride
may be ~~the~~ ^{the} greatest in
the person who ^{has the most} grasps
most thoroughly ^{grasp of} his own
~~worthlessness~~. Worthlessness.

Est Triplex

All ~~created~~ creatures
have a threefold being

FORWARD

1) Seek to manifest subject and principles of science of nature.

Subject? That about which we seek (reasoned) knowledge. Must determine scope of investigation. Must characterize the subject, distinguish it from others, determine aspect or formality under which subject is considered.

Principles of science? That from which (reasoned) knowledge is derived, on which it is based, on which it depends. of subject /

'Science'? Word used but can't assume meaning known. Certainly is knowledge; and reasoned knowledge; knowledge of why this or that is true of subject.

Passage from Meta I - art and experience.

But even this not wholly adequate. Much presupposed in this passage. For clarity, must analyze an instance of 'science' in strictest sense, by comparison with which other kinds of knowledge are called 'scientific'.

Example of demonstration in geometry.

Example analyzed. Characteristic features determined; understanding of nature of subject grasped; manifested in its definition. From this definition we see that it has the given attribute; the definition provides the reason for the inherence of the attribute, and the necessitating reason or cause.

Because the procedures followed in the investigation of other subjects are akin to that employed in geometry, we extend the word 'scientific' to such procedures—and the word 'science' to cover the results, the reasoned knowledge, of such investigation.

Examples of 'science' is this different but related sense. Contrast them briefly to that found in geometry.

Mathematics provides science par excellence. However are other disciplines which truly share in the character of that science found in math. One of them found in what is called by Aris. the science of nature.

Example taken from Physics. Compared to demonstration in geometry.

Such examples of scientific knowledge infrequent. But they are goal of phil of nature. Thus if they could be had, would be from definitions of this cause of thing or that that we would reason to—demonstrate—this or that about the natural thing.

2) Mathematical Physics.

Not yet mentioned, even though now taken as equivalent to 'science'. Separate consideration of this called for. Magnificent achievements. Is extension of phil of nature.

But does it have nature of science in strict sense?

Question answered in analysis of its procedure and comparison of it to that found in math and phil of nature.

From what does it proceed in its reasoned knowledge of things?

Symbolic construction. Not define things at all, unlike Aristotelian mode of procedure.

Math physics proceeds by way of operational definition. Example of this in opposition to kind of definition in phil of nature.

Math employed in this discipline radically different from math of ancients.

Calculation. Character of. Contrasted with its role in ancient math.

Numbers do not represent any unity on part of things

Still, math physics will terminate in, as it began with, knowledge of things of nature. Quote from Einstein.

Provisional character of knowledge gained in math physics.

This feature perhaps most evidently reveals fact that math phys falls far short of science in strict sense, or if this not acceptable, of the kind of reasoned knowledge we would like to have of nature. It is perhaps less clear why this is the case, but the reason is nonetheless definite. Found in kind of definition employed.

All this summary and unsatisfactory. The themes we have dealt with so briefly here will make up large part of what follows. What we have simply laid down here we shall establish in the body of this work. Forward will have served purpose if some clarification of words used has been gained, if the limited character of contemporary 'science' has been appreciated, and if the possibility of a strict science of nature has been recognized.

1) Extent of science here set forth will present us to realize as the character of the knowledge with which we deal daily and night

2) A new recognition of such knowledge as knowledge by many modern thinkers - Hume: no necessary connection between facts and laws.

Sujets de communications

1. Mathematical abstraction, as understood by contemporary authors on the nature of mathematics (e.g. A. N. Whitehead, B. Russell, J. Hadamard), is what we call "abstractio totius", and negative. It has nothing in common with the "abstractio formae" that is proper to mathematical science.

2. To equate the subject of mathematical science with the subject of the art of calculation (λογιστική) is to postulate intelligible matter (ὅλη νοητή) as essential to all things and notions.

3. The difference between names, symbols, and infinite names; between the symbols of formal logic (termini transcendentis), of mathematics, algebra, and mathematical physics. De Morgan's views on logical symbols, infinite names, and the universe of discourse, examined in the light of these distinctions.

4. Quomodo intelligendum sit illud dictum "natura determinatur ad unum". Qua ratione Hegel et Engels ipsis conferunt rebus quoddam esse quod habent in intellectu tantum; et in quo convenient cum platoniciis.

5. Agens a natura nullomodo potest esse causa per se ejus quod est a casu; qua ratione hoc proprie convenit agenti a proposito.

6. Potentia simul contradictionis, vel rationalis vel naturalis, est de ratione cujuslibet possibilis quod necessario opponitur; et semper dicit respectum ad actionem propter finem, unde ad bonum et ad appetitum.

7. Comme question de fait et de façon assez générale, la "nécessité qui vient de la matière" (Physique II, 9, 199 b 34-200 a 15) est aujourd'hui considérée comme le postulat fondamental de toute science expérimentale, y compris l'économique.

8. Le terme 'hasard', commun, selon l'usage, aux expressions 'hasard dans la nature' et 'lois du hasard', est strictement équivoque.

9. Quodlibet opus naturae est opus alicujus substantiae intelligentis quae est causa universalis in causando; quod tamen opus a natura dicitur, ratione principii passivi. Et hoc valet ad quaestionem de possibilitate evolutionis.

Nulla datur generatio naturalis et univoca sine causa universali seu aequivoca actualiter et per se, generatum producente secundum rationem speciei. V. g., quamvis Socrates sit per se causa filii ejus secundum quod iste est hic homo, non tamen per se causa est ejus quod iste filius sit homo, quia nullum particulare agens univocum

potest esse simpliciter causa speciei; generando enim, Socrates esset causa speciei humanae, ideoque omnis hominis, et per consequens suimetipsius, cum ipse homo quidam sit - ut patet ex III Contra Gentiles, c. 65, et multis aliis locis. Causis enim debent proportionaliter respondere effectus, ut ostenditur in II Physicorum (D. Thomas, lect. 6). Et ideo, ejus quod tam Socrates quam filius unius speciei sint in re, ita ut eadem omnino ratio vere de utroque praedicetur univoce et per se, hoc ipsum habet causam per se et non per accidens. Quodsi generabilium non darentur causae naturaliter agentes nisi quae effectibus eadem sint in specie, omnia, quantum ad naturam attinet, a casu in speciem prodierent.

[Videtur autem hic esse quoddam dubium, utrum scilicet consideratio de causis aequivocis solum pertineat ad metaphysicum, vel etiam ad naturalem. Sciendum est autem quod ad metaphysicum pertinet considerare de ipsa causae universalis ratione, ut patet ex Divo Thoma in VI Metaph., lect. 3. Sed ad naturalem pertinet ostendere saltem an est omnium causarum quarum proprii effectus sensu constant, et eorum quae cum materia sensibili definiuntur, ut patet de individuis ejusdem speciei; et ex ipsa motus ratione, secundum quod motus est propria passio mobilis, seu actus existentis in potentia in quantum hujusmodi; naturalis philosophus ostendit cujuslibet motus qualiscumque speciei esse

unum primum movens immobile, supra omnem speciem motus existens, et extra omnium mobilium genera; cujus tamen naturam considerare ad metaphysicum pertinet. - Sed quia multi circa probationem naturalem moventis omnino immobili decipiuntur, notandum est quod in hoc naturalis non procedit ex motu in eo quod motus participat aliquid de natura quantitatis, secundum quod divisio motus sumitur vel ex divisione spatii vel ex divisione mobilis; ista consideratio motus pertinet ad scientias medias inter mathematicam et naturalem, in quibus tractatur de mensuris motuum (ut habet D. Thomas, In Boeth. de Trinit., q. 5, a. 3, ad 5). Hujusmodi autem scientiae non demonstrant nisi per causam formalem, quam a mathematicis accipiunt; non autem per agentem.]

Exist.

Thomists:

Kierkegaard emphasis on existence over
& against sheer logical thought.

Antecedents: Plato, Hobbes, Leibniz,
Spinoza, Hegel.

Thomistic "existence" → essence: esse ultimately
actualities.

Not science { when distinct: between ss. &
dist. } practical life. { when identity: God. exist.

Ambo: { esse simpliciter } tm. sec. quid.
{ esse sec. quid. } tm. singul.

How bridge gap between { are
should be?

Not by emphasis on existence, but by
action according to virtue.

Difficulty emphasized by
Modern Existentialism:

Things about which we choose:

- existence
- person { phys.
psych.
- circumstances { social status
education prim^o.

- uncertainty of exist. death. dread.

- stranger to occurrence of self.

Reply:

1^o We do choose: in comparing;
comparing "Fiat" this,
present. highest form of activity.
No Passion: willingly. Faith
in Div. Wisdom & Providence.
(Not knowl. alone.) Not Ethical.

2^o Strangers? Uncertainty? Hope.
Fear? Forthright.

3^o When as should be? Charity.
Treasure hidden in treasure.
Perubugman, since God...
see as I am seen.

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de multis ueterum uirorum pueris uigilantibus
opinio bonitatis haberi potest: plura etiam
sanctissimi uiri in aliquibus uisum
deficere: Ep IV, 54.

precepts which correspond to the relativities of the feudal social system are not held to be natural law; they are viewed as judicial precepts established by men. But such laws are variable, as St. Thomas points out in the following passage: "The judicial precepts established by men retain their binding force forever, so long as the state of government remains the same. But if the state or nation pass to another form of government, the laws must needs be changed. For democracy, which is government by the people, demands different laws from those of oligarchy, which is government by the rich, as the Philosopher shows. Consequently, when the state of that people changed, the judicial precepts had to be changed also."¹

In the sentence immediately following the one we have just quoted, Reinhold Niebuhr says: "The confusion between ultimate religious perspectives and relative historical ones in Catholic thought accounts for the fury and self-righteousness into which Catholicism is betrayed when it defends feudal types of civilization in contemporary history as in Spain for instance."² We are not concerned here with the truth or error of this statement. It is relevant to our discussion only insofar as it reflects a judgment on doctrine. Supposing that the attitude of the Church toward a particular form of government, at a given place and time, is really such as the author describes, could it not be precisely by virtue of its solicitude to take into account, even in the face of widespread criticism, the contingent circumstances which our sometimes oversimplified generalities about "contemporary history" tend to overlook and which we are apt to convert into general standards for every situation regardless of its peculiarity?

CHARLES DE KONINCK.

General Standards and Particular Situations in Relation to the Natural Law*

Speaking of Orthodox Catholicism's concept of the natural law, Reinhold Niebuhr, in his Gifford Lectures, makes the following reservation: "The difficulty with this impressive structure of Catholic ethics, finally elaborated into a detailed casuistic application of general moral standards to every conceivable particular situation, is that it constantly insinuates religious absolutes into highly contingent and historical moral judgments."¹ And so he speaks of "The mistake of Catholic moral casuistry to derive relative moral judgments too simply from the presuppositions of its natural law..." Perhaps we should add that the same author considers "Thomistic ethics" as an instance of this rationalism.²

Yet I believe every disciple of St. Thomas would, no less than Reinhold Niebuhr, condemn any moral doctrine which would have that note. No practical judgment could be true if it were simply the result of an "application of general moral standards" to a particular situation. Moral standards are not universal in representation, and in the field of action there is no such thing as "every conceivable particular situation." No amount of casuistic "ifs" could meet and be adequate to the contingent circumstances of conduct. There can be no universal file of proximate norms for behaviour. The proper precepts of individual actions are to be found in the particular precepts of prudence — not in the law, which, natural or human, retains a certain degree of generality. No law can be the particular premise of an operative syllogism in which one infers what is to be done *here* and *now*. The outcome of reasoning from law alone could be no more than a general conclusion pertaining to practical science. If, on the other hand, the particular premise of a syllogism were no more than the statement of a fact that is speculatively true, the syllogism would not be what we call operative; and if it alone were taken as a sufficient basis for action, this action would be practically false.

An instance of such a type of reasoning was pointed out recently by Gabriel Marcel in his *Preface* to Gheorghiu's novel entitled *La vingt-cinquième heure*. Although the general premise is taken from positive law, the result would be the same if the law were a natural one:

"The writer Traian Kornea and his wife Nora, though they were always sympathetic to the cause of the Allies, the more so as she was a

* A paper read at the twenty-fourth annual meeting of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, held at St. Paul, Minn., April 1950. Reprinted here with permission from *The Naturalist*, Vol. XXV.
1. *Op. cit.*, p. 221.
2. *Op. cit.*, p. 221.

1. *La Hec*, 9.104, n.3, ad 2.
2. *Op. cit.*, p. 221.

Jews and barely managed to escape from persecution, have travelled, at the time of the German collapse of '45, hundreds of kilometers on foot in order to reach the American zone, of which they fondly dream as a haven of refuge. At last, they find themselves in Weimar. But it is certainly not the spirit of Goethe which inspires the American governor of that city. He cares little about what Traian and his wife are or think. What matters is only this: they are bearers of a Roumanian passport; Roumania is officially considered by the United States as an enemy Power; ergo, Traian and his wife must be treated as enemy subjects, and put in prison. It is most remarkable, let it be noted in passing, how easily the method of syllogistic reasoning—in which, until a comparatively recent date, so many short-sighted thinkers imagined to hold the very instrument of Reason—comes to subserve whatever aberration of Reason. It is really a machine, with which (as with all other machines, for that matter) one may do what one likes. True thought is something entirely different."

Why is the conclusion, in this particular instance, a practical error? Not because it is reached by "syllogistic reasoning," but because the official in question "cares little about what Traian and his wife are or think." Insofar as such a disposition is the reason why he infers that "Traian and his wife must be treated as enemy subjects, and put into prison," the conclusion is practically false—and his reasoning is a good example of a bad operative syllogism. For practical truth does not consist in the mind's conformity to what is, but in its conformity with the rectified appetite.¹ Let us note, then, that even if the official were well-informed and knew who those two people are and what they think, he could still draw a false conclusion as to what is to be done, so long as he "cares little."

Practical reasoning is not a matter of reason alone, not even of the kind of practical knowledge which is confined to reason. "... Prudentia non est in ratione solum, sed habet aliquid in appetitu... Inquantum enim (ethica, oeconomica et politica) sunt in sola ratione, dicuntur quaedam scientiae practicae."² And so we may well agree with Gabriel Marcel in condemning the kind of syllogistic reasoning he illustrates by the example we have seen. No amount of such reasoning could ever reach a practical truth. And this is the same as to say that practical reasoning, in matters of conduct, cannot consist in the simple application of a general rule to a particular so-called objective case. With Reinhold Niebuhr we must admit that a doctrine which propounds such a method as a guarantee of practical truth in action is wholly unacceptable. We share Niebuhr's view for reasons we may quote from St. Thomas, with whom the Church has found no fault on this score.

1. "... Bonum practici intellectus non est veritas absoluta, sed veritas 'confesse ac habens,' id est 'conformiter ad appetitum rectum.'" St. THOMAS, *In VI Ethicor.*, lect. 2 (ed. PROCTOR), m. 1130-1.—*In I IIa*, q. 57, a. 5, ad 3.
2. St. THOMAS, *In VI Ethicor.*, lect. 7, n. 1200.—CABRILLAN, *Comm. in Iam IIa*, qq. 57-58.

We all know that we should do the good & avoid evil: but if
 they would preserve of the natural law. *Alors*.
 We know that we must do just in all circumstances.

We know that we must pay our debts as a true creditor.
 They wouldn't come to the me.... But everyone knows &
 knows that we want the money to pay a man to place a limit
 in a place to which the insurance.

To knowledge of the universal law enough to know what duty...
 We must act justly, with courage, and with temperance.
 We have had by knowledge of the universal law?

That would be easy.
 Actually, we obey the universal law when we have
 these virtues. But how do we know that
 we have them? If not we do not yet have them,
 how do we acquire them? Who will tell us
 what to do? Where is this knowledge to be found?
 Moral science? How to acquire virtue of temperance?
 There are virtues. But will the knowledge of
 these virtues be acquisition of virtue and
 behaviour a trial to universal law?

This attempt has been made: Ethics, more...
 based on Ethics, the more knowledge of it...

But there is no such thing: science, justice, peace
 cannot be obtained. Ethics by action, yes...

As Aristotle, Ethics II, 2, 1103b25.
 distinction between making & doing (as: who applies,
 who makes the good).

But that which is in the state of mind and in the action
 that which is in the state of mind and in the action.

The end of an action, desires in us in his words:

(a) knowledge of the moral law: of the very principle of action.

(b) action: thus the end, desires in us by reason of the moral law, leads to which we live - - - personal end of action.

Quia ea pure sunt ad finem:
We are propelled as to morality by moral
Purposes not independent of natural law, though
distinct; not of moral virtue.

Difficulties:

Comparison of natural law with laws of nature.

Two comparisons of law, law with laws of nature
do for the most - - - by finis.

Comparison of making & doing: intention.

Comparison of thought & action. Ideal. Comparison
of natural law with natural necessity.

All attempts to escape diff. of moral action.

En quoi a consisté le péché originel?

1. Les Pères de l'Eglise ont maintenu - puis S. Thomas et les ont mis sur ce sujet - que le péché originel était un péché de l'esprit, et nullement, comme on l'entend parfois, un péché contre la chair. Il serait pour le moins téméraire de mettre cette doctrine en cause.
2. S. Thomas rapporte l'opinion de quelques anciens, selon laquelle le mode de reproduction eût été tout autre s'il n'y avait eu le péché originel. En revanche, S. Thomas enseigne qu'il aurait été le même et, loin d'être diminuée, la dilection de l'acte conjugal aurait été plus grande.
3. Récemment, M. Coppens a soutenu que même d'après S. Augustin on ne doit pas exclure l'acte conjugal du péché originel. Son étude a été portablement critiquée dans une série d'articles publiés dans Gregorianum.
4. Sous toutes réserves, on peut, il nous semble, avancer l'opinion que matériellement ce péché a consisté dans ~~l'acte~~ le coïtus, mais formellement dans un acte d'orgueil. Ce n'était pas un appétit désordonné du sens, qui pourrait y pourvoir, puisque cet appétit était entièrement soumis à la raison. Et cet acte n'aurait pu être coupable que s'il était tout simplement défectueux. L'appétit désordonné est une erreur, non pas du coïtus comme tel, mais d'après de la désobéissance, acte de l'esprit. Que s'ils ont éprouvé un désordre dans l'acte de la chair, ce désordre était déjà une conséquence de l'orgueil qui en fut le principe. En somme, parce que le coïtus n'est pas de lui-même désordonné, rien n'empêche qu'il n'ait été l'acte ~~physique~~ susceptible auquel nos premiers parents ont succombé par orgueil.
5. C'est donc parce que

THEOLOGY

For Students of Theology or for the General Public.

28. THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOOD AND EVIL.

'Knowledge of good and evil' can be understood in many ways. What is meant by this expression in Genesis iii? Why should Eve have been first to desire such knowledge? How can this desire be sinful, since the knowledge of evil is not evil and God possesses it as no one else? Moreover, the end Eve had in mind was essentially good -- in fact the highest good. The interpretation of this passage by St. Augustine and St. Thomas. How this inordinate desire is still with us -- though aiming at a lower good such as security at any cost. ("And you all know security // Is mortals' chiefest enemy"). Illustrations from modern philosophies and social theories.

29. ORIGINAL SIN AND THE SENSE OF TOUCH.

Why is it that Original Sin, a purely spiritual one of revolt against God, should have affected man primarily in his lower faculties: in those which share most in the character of nature, viz. the appetites associated with the conservation of the individual and the propagation of the species? If, on the other hand, the higher powers of man had been affected in the same way, he would be incapable of human action, and could not be held to account for what he does. The inordinate pursuit of the pleasures of touch -- of food and drink, of comfort and the ardours of the flesh -- is admittedly the most common of human frailties; to the point where unruly concupiscence is called a law: *lex fomitis*, which provides the economic life with a basic constant. Yet each individual remains free and responsible for his actions -- though not in the above-the-cloud way of existentialist 'options.'

To moderate the pleasures of touch is the proper object of the virtue of temperance (not to be confused with teetotalism). However, subservience to the law in the many remains an obvious fact that is the root of social instability and the foot-hold of the ambitious few. From earliest times, systems have been propounded to outwit the general law, most of them beginning in pride and ending in self-indulgence (Manichaeists, Cathares, Jansenists, Quietists, etc.).

The only efficient, human method of freeing the individual from subservience to the law of concupiscence was recognized by the pagan philosopher, Aristotle (whom St. Thomas repeats on this score): to develop the right habits in the very young, by education and discipline: For "it makes no small difference whether we form habits of one kind or another from our very youth; it makes a very great difference, or rather all the difference -- *quin potius totum ex hoc dependeat*. A modern philosopher, Irving Babbitt, puts it in the following terms: "If the discipline is to be effective, so that a man will like and dislike the right

the word: 1. mind
or Name 10 matter

In word must. reality comes off
by mind or then in aesthetic
disinterested from action { or should be
"What is it?"

Word: Mind cause, but
really mixed with mind. ---

Name: Matter cause, mind mixed
with quality of matter: spirit. embodied in
sense of word. Good abstraction of
mind.

Word: aesthetic excitation. Then.

Name: mechanical excitation. Self-matter.
Soul absorbed by its external, physical aspect.

Matter work. — latest theory
of general law.

Should be a good room
then. (Philosophy).

Reception: by external abstraction.

Aesthetic intuition: everything for
nothing. Take hold by ---

- ① Sur le ^{Rosaire} ~~chaplet~~ - conférence ordinairement intitulée "On Repetition"
2 pp. 5 1/2 x 8 1/2
- ② Poetry and the Experience of Evil - 5 pp. dactyl. 8 1/2 x 11
- ③ La mort de Dieu et la passion de l'Eglise - 2 pp. 8 1/2 x 11
- ④ (Règle prochaine de notre conduite ...) - 5 pp. 8 1/2 x 11
brouillons.

① / no XIII. Dist. { form: meditation on the mysteries.
All the mysteries of our faith.
matter: the recitation.

The repetitions on the part of the matter. Many people object to this. Even little Theresa of Lisieux had a difficulty here. The rosary often held to be a good for the illiterate.

This latter point is unhistorical. "Contemplata alius tradere."

Criticism of the Rosary proceeds from a failure to take into account its form - the meditation. But it also fails to take into account the nature and purpose of repetition.

First look at repetition in nature.

The stuff of natural things
Their motion and time
The indiv. many of one species.

We are imperible without repetition in our physical make-up: of electrical charges, atoms, molecules, cells, tissues.

We cannot live without breathing over and over; our heartbeats are repetitions. Our daily bread. We are not just repetition, but we cannot be and live without it.

edax 102. ~~The~~ ^{Repetition} time is arrested by repetition.
tomorrow and tomorrow and tomorrow.
Our houses are made of repetition material. So

①

200 XIII. 200.

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The repetitionism on the part of the matter. Many people object to this. Even little Theresa of Lisieux had a difficulty here. The rosary often held to be good for the illiterate.

This latter point is unhistorical. "Contemplata alias tractare."

Criticism of the Rosary proceeds from a ~~failure~~ to take into account its form - the meditation.

But it also fails to take into account the nature and ~~of~~ purpose of repetition.

First look at repetition in nature.

The stuff of natural things
their motion and time

The indiv. many of one species.

We are impossible without repetition in our physical make-up: of electrical charges, atoms, molecules, cells, tissues.

We cannot live without breathing over and over; our heartbeats are repetitions. Our daily bread. We are not just repetition, but we cannot be and live without it.

200 x 200.

~~The~~ ~~time~~ time is arrested by repetition.

tomorrow and tomorrow and tomorrow.
Our houses are made of repetitions, material. So is our language. The sounds of our music.

All that surrounds us depends upon repetition both to be what it is and to exist. (Arist: the ~~idea~~ when everlastingness cannot be achieved in the individual, nature resorts to repetition - ideas quodammodo as to purpose.

A house of bricks not just bricks.

Rosary, Our F's, Hail Marys, glorias are not the rosary. There is repetition here, and a great deal of it. But it has a purpose: the meditation on the mysteries. The medit. being associated with repetition is excitation. It is peculiarly proportionate to the kind of beings we are. The material provides our thinking on the mysteries with a stability most appropriately provided by repetition. Like a man who can reflect better when he walks. Yet his steps are just repetition of the same.

~~Rosary is a spiritual eclipse, not an abstract~~

Rosary, a divine eclipse. Not wholly abstract.

Its mysteries are history. They express the history of God becoming man from the Virgin Mary.

The first joyful mystery, The Annunciation - the Angelic Salutation. It is the announcement of the true Beginning of divine life on earth.

By repeating "Hail Mary" we remain abreast, as it were, with the ~~present~~ ^{lasting} reality of the Redemption Incarnation, and with the true power of grace which is a participation in God's own nature.

~~By repeating~~

Strikingly adapted to our nature, the Rosary is a sign of the Church's kindness, her benignity. *Nipra sum, sed per dona.*

What is poetry?

What is the ~~highest~~ ^{supreme} form?

Man to do with the evil that
befall, man - an evil out
of proportion with its cause.
Not every evil - but the
kind that induces fear and

pity.

Since it has so much to do
with evil, and since the
evil

"Chaque homme ~~est~~ une
goutte d'indivision et chose qu'il
ignore qu'il soit. Saurai-t-on
le que son secret? Cette
simple recherche s'élève à
philosophie."

Paul Valéry, *Mouvements*
pensées et autres.

which he is unaware of knowing
to know all that we know?
This simple investigation takes
in all of philosophy.

mm

~~mm~~

In the latter case there could be
no connection between beginning
and end, for the end will
be such only because of some
connection with the beginning
through a middle. The beginning
of Descartes, *Res*: his irreducibility
and the slaughter of his own
children; the middle, his
enquiry; ~~where~~ where he came from
and how he came to be what he is;
the end:

Poetry and the experience of Evil.

(1)

The poetry of our day has become so esoteric that only poets can read or understand one another. The same is true about music, music of the serial kind, for example. There is on the other hand a poetic still avidly read or seen by the non-poetic public, but its medium is usually prose not verse, the novel and not the drama; just as there is a contemporary music which the public obviously enjoy, such as rock and roll.

It is not my business to judge the merits of a poetry that can be enjoyed by poets only; yet I will indulge for a moment some observations which might provide at least the antecedents of a judgment. -- The poets themselves tell us nowadays that they write for and expect to be understood by poets only. Mallarme was such a man. His poem is strikingly arty, but it does not move me as a rational animal. It is so arty that it appeals to cold detached reason only; it has nothing to do with me as an animal which is what I most certainly am. If I want to indulge pure reason, I prefer mathematics. Of course I am not a poet nor a musician. But this is neither here nor there. The point is that one may be allowed to enjoy Homer or Sophocles, Shakespeare or Keats and yet be a total outsider to the highest poetic achievements of this day.

This observation should not be interpreted as a protest in disguise. I believe what I said to be not only true; it is also quite natural. I mean that the development is a normal one and, in a sense, inevitable--as predictable as flamboyant Gothic.

Allow me to express my observation in a simple phrase: the poetry I referred to is specializing itself away from the animality of man, becoming formal to the extreme. It does not appeal, nor does it intend to appeal, to the passions of

(2)

pity,
love, sadness, fear, /anger, or joy. It is a triumph of words
whose meanings are veiled ~~xxxxxxx~~ as too pedestrian. "Do
not try to find out what the poet means", we are told, "but just
look at what he does!" You can see why it would take another
poet to appreciate that.

There is a law of natural evolution which we might couch
in the following words: natural organism tend to become so
specialized that they can no longer progress nor survive
the adversities of nature. ^{They reach a dead-end.} Man differs from other animals
by his lack of specialization. Attend to our hands and to
our mouths and to our nakedness. It is thanks to reason that
we can manage and compensate for this lack of specialization.
In fact, without this lack, our reason would be inoperative
nor would there be a reason to have reason at all.

My point at this juncture is that on the strictly human
~~plane~~ plane, we may be refining and specializing ourselves out
of existence, to ~~xxx~~ paraphrase James Joyce. We are withdrawing
into the unnatural recesses of mind, 'all passion spent.'

Yet there is at this same time another form of ~~poetic~~
poetic which does not appeal to a reason ever more refined;
it has not forgotten the animal, but does turn its back on the
'human'. Perhaps I should qualify this. It appeals to the animality
of man inasmuch as this animality can be distinctively much
lower than that of the beast. This we find in the novel that
explores human concupiscence and lust with physical, unpoetic
impact; or in the kind of popular music that agitates the ~~human~~
chemistry of the human and drives him to contortions that are
visually sordid and which this same human would not dare look
upon in the most lustful of the beasts. Returning to our novel,
I mean that it deals mainly with man's life of unruly concupiscence;

and even the irascibility of man is seen as relevant only inasmuch as he struggles to maintain or achieve a life of lust.

"But that is the way things are" we are told. And of course it is, and was always known to be so. Mind you, I do not refer to the cheap pornographic novel. I have in mind ~~expensive~~ works which do not aim to titillate our easily aroused concupiscence but which in fact cannot achieve their ends without doing so; much as if we had reached a stage where the sordidness of man had become the middle to the end, an end without hope. ~~Even~~ Even the heroes of classic tragedy were spared such an exit.

This is not unrelated to the contention of some that ^{the} artist, to describe our repulsive selves in an appealing way, must have personal experience of ~~these things~~ whatever he deals with; and that even the evil of commission is redeemed by poetic transposition. We are left to understand, and some in fact so do understand it, that no one could write intelligently about evil without the personal experience of committing evil.

This is a very interesting novelty from the viewpoint of literary criticism. First it is no doubt a novel thesis. As a general statement it is utterly absurd. It displays all too tellingly a lack of poetic imagination. The true poet can understand and convey in a pleasing way how a murderer feels without having the experience of committing murder. The same for all human vices--except those that are utterly against nature.

The question is: must one have the experience of committing evil to know what evil is? How do we know evil?

--Speculatively: as we define it.

--Morally:--in a formal way/. The moral theologian and the poet have an amazing knowledge of evil of

evil which does not in the least presuppose
commission on their part. In fact, their knowledge
will be profound in the measure that they are detached.
Intus existence prohibet extraneum. You cannot see
with your finger stuck in your eye. *Foundered eye sees, but imperfectly.*
No one knows evil as thoroughly as God does. How
can this be. Known in knower according to the
mode of the knower. In this sense it is good to
know evil. Essential ingredient of a good universe.
There is, finally, another way of knowing evil: the knowledge
one has in the experience of commission. But the interesting
aspect of this knowledge is that it is incommunicable,
as incommunicable as one's own individual action.
Although this knowledge is incommunicable, there can
be communication about it among those who share the
same action. (Compare to sensation: qomo incomm., qomo
communication about it.) In short, if there is to
be communication about evil in this order, they who
communicate must share the same kind of knowledge. *...better it*
But the poet has his vengeance without that knowledge, and the
(Some years ago Franz Werfel wrote a book of essays entitled
Theologoumena.....This just another variant of the
same idea.)

That was our first point, a general one. The second is more
specific. We all know that the experience of evil appealed
to as an indispensable ingredient of the poetic person, has
little to do with justice or injustice, fortitude or cowardice,
but very specifically with incontinence or intemperance. (I
distinguish these two.) The object of temperance is...Tactual
pleasure, even when utterly sane and moderate, are of the

lowest kind. We have them in common with the beasts who live for none other. When they man they dominate his whole life, he becomes lower than the beast. (When ~~in~~ in this predicament, he is too dull to know it. He has, so to speak, to be forced under the shower.)

The other day I saw on television a group of ~~five~~^{under} children in kindergarten doing the twist. The spectators thought them cute. I'm afraid that many ~~people~~ would condemn my taste as I judge such spectatcles both degrading and ridiculous.

Do not misunderstand. I am not at all a pessimist, not even a mild grouch. The Christian conception of depravity pervarsity is at bottom and/~~maxixixixhaxixixix~~ an optimistic one. If God lets the world somber in what appears to be hopeless confusion, this must be interpreted as a sign of his high designs, for...

.....

Meantime we must heed St. Paul: let us not understand that because God turns evil to the good, we ought to say: faciamus malum ut eveniat bonum. Our Lord Himself told us the last word on the subject: Scandal there must be, but woe to him through whom it comes about.

St. Thomas's application:

If there is no future resurrex., if only soul immortal, if
I remain in death, then I shall never be happy after death.

(ad Cor.)

St. Peter does not now ~~resurrex.~~---

Threefold reason why Church nevertheless, --- Synecdoche

If no resurrection, the person who merited ----

Praesupposita

Soul, anima, psychē, à propos "human soul": third
imposition of the name. Name just what we know for sure.

Primo; dist. { a quo
ad quod

Here, in the first impos. { a quo
ad quod } same breath of life
in animals, in hum.
like for similar. qual.

Secundo: this first impos. is 'id a quo'

for the next: the intrinsic principle of life:

applies to all natural things alive; cannot of elephants.
Exer. of being alive.

Tertio, as in Engl. (soul), name impos. to signify something
whose diff. has to be demonstr. ~ like spirituality.

This meaning used today. It hath { as meaning;
as a unity: ~~emitted~~ ^{proposed}

Object, operation, power, root of power.

Concept. of universal today such that. ---
only as a class. Reduces to
unity of symbol.

No such problem arises today in context of
contemporary science. Must realize difficulty.

Our discuss. must bear on question of names,
symbols, etc. ...

What we say of the soul depends on that.

Same holds for 'person'. Primo mark; then, what the mark
stands for: person accord. to second impos.

When we say that the elephant, or the man is dead,
we mean he no longer exists. This holds of person.

Person is said of the whole. Ratio parts entire. Rat. personae
Soul being only part, soul not person. Name 'person', and
of person, do not apply to soul in separation.

The Catholic Faith teaches that there shall be a future
resurrection. Reason given by X.

La mort de Dieu et la passion de l'Eglise.

Kue Dieu est mort - article de foi - ; que dans cette destruction de son humanité il nous a sauvés, égalé de foi.

~~Qu'est-ce~~

Que veut dire la mort de Dieu ?

Par de la divinité. Sans son humanité. Destruction de la nature humaine. Celle que vous voyez ici tous les jours. Paradoxe : Dieu immortel meurt. C'est le plus grand des maux, le plus terrible.

Elle l'a été pour le Christ - qui a tremblé devant la mort. Il en a souffert plus que qui conque. Il a supplié le P. de lui enlever la calice. - Pour nous, la crainte de la mort ~~connaît~~ peut être étouffée par l'écoulement de la souffrance physique. Mais non pas dans le Christ. La souffrance principale intérieure. Mort ranceur du péché. Espérance poétique.

La passion du Christ, la mort de Dieu, se poursuit dans l'Eglise. Elle meurt sans cesse dans ses membres - au sens très littéral. Ce sont les frères du Christ, qui forment le Corps mystique dont il est la tête, ce sont ses fibres qui souffrent pour lui; et quand il meurt, c'est lui qui meurt en eux. La mort de Dieu est telle qu'elle embrasse la mort de tous ceux qui meurent en lui, comme ses souffrances comprennent toutes les souffrances à laquelle l'Eglise est assujettie.

L'Eglise souffre pour la vérité dans ses martyrs —
plus nombreux que jamais. Dans les enfants qu'on
lui enlève. Dans les grands combats spirituels
pour l'intégrité de la foi — combat semblable à
celui des anges.

Il importe de prendre une attitude positive
en face des grandes souffrances de l'Eglise et du
siècle. La mort de Dieu a eu l'effet le plus
profond qui soit dans ^{l'histoire} la création: le salut,
jusqu'à la possession de Dieu tel qu'il est en
lui-même: Dieu qui est la vie.

Tentation du manichéisme, en face du mal
et de l'erreur. Sengir; propre volonté. Si nous
désespérons, c'est très certainement parce que nous
mis toute confiance dans notre propre volonté.

Le bon chrétien doit néanmoins sans cesse à lui-même,
c'est-à-dire se conformer à la volonté du Père (comme
la volonté humaine du Christ...) afin que le Christ
vive en lui et qu'il vive de lui au point
où l'on est en de vivre en soi-même.

Cela n'a rien de dramatique. Cela s'accomplit
dans les devoirs ordinaires — just en marchant,
en travaillant, en mangeant.

Pour le chrétien vivant selon l'esprit de
l'Eglise, qui se li. S. Esprit, la Passion de
l'Eglise, en lap. il est engagé, va de soi, encore
qu'il doive demander en tte humilité qu'il se

le Père peut nous enlever ce calice, qu'il le fasse,
mais, qu'avant tout, sa volonté soit faite.

Finalement, vaut la peine de méditer
sur le caractère positif de la passion.

du mot de Dieu, la passion rédemptrice
à quelque chose de très paradoxale : la
passion est de soi sans mérite. Libre acceptation de
la volonté de Dieu pour le bien de son Eglise : . . .

Re/ Le philosophe et la théologie.

La théologie qui, elle, se sert de
philosophie afin que "facilem manuducatur,"
doit-elle dévier à cette philosophie
la manuductio sans pour ~~elle~~
la philosophie est impossible ?

Ni la connaissance de la loi naturelle, ou syndé-
rèse, ni même les conclusions de la science morale,
ne sauraient jamais constituer à elles seules la
règle prochaine et efficace de notre conduite; elles
servent tout au plus de règle commune et éloignée,
encore que nécessaire absolument. La raison en est
leur caractère abstrait et universel, alors que l'agir
humain est fait d'actions singulières contingentes.
Il est sans doute vrai que les préceptes premiers et
très communs de la loi naturelle/^{par exemple,} sont absolument cer-
tains et connus de tous, mais seulement in universali;
et à cause précisément de leur très grande ~~xxx~~
universalité et abstraction du singulier, ils sont
par contre tout ce qu'il y a de plus indéterminé et d'
incertain comme règle de l'agere hic et nunc, et
partant de moins apte à le diriger comme il convient
dans ce qu'il a de singulier et de contingent. ^{L'autre part,} ~~Par~~
~~ailleurs,~~ les préceptes secondaires de la loi naturelle,
parce que moins abstraits et universels que les
premiers, sont moins certains in universali (verum
habent solum ut in pluribus), cependant ^{ils} constituent
une règle d'action plus déterminée et plus efficace
eu égard aux opérations singulières contingentes; et
davantage encore les conclusions plus particulières
de la science morale. C'est ce qui fait dire à Aris-
tote..1.(Eth.II, c.7; s.Th., lect.viii, nn.333-34.-
I-II, q.77, a.2, ad 1m).

Raison de tout cela: les actions humaines sont singu-
lières, et seule une connaissance singulière peut
être immédiatement proportionnée, et partant servir

La connaissance de la loi naturelle, d'une part, et de la science morale, d'autre part, ne pourrait jamais constituer la règle prochaine de notre conduite. Le fait de savoir sans erreur possible que dans toutes les circonstances de la vie nous devons faire le bien et éviter le mal n'implique pas la vérité du jugement sur ce qui est bien ou mal hic et nunc. Cette indétermination où nous laisse la connaissance de la loi naturelle ne provient pas uniquement de l'incertitude où nous pouvons nous trouver touchant certaines déterminations particulières de cette loi, ou les propositions qu'on en peut obtenir par manière de conclusions. Quand même, en plus des principes généraux de la loi naturelle, saisis avec grande certitude, nous avons une connaissance suffisante de ses principes plus particuliers, tel le précepte 'Il faut rendre le dépôt,' nous n'aurions pas encore ce qu'il faut pour savoir quoi faire hic et nunc. La pratique de la justice demande que l'agent tienne compte des circonstances de l'action, lesquelles sont variables; dans un cas particulier, la remise du dépôt pourrait être une injustice — si, par exemple, le créancier le réclame pour financer une

(1)

attaque contre la patrie.

(1) IaIIae, q. 94, a. 4, c.

Il en est encore de même pour les sciences morales, telles l'éthique et la politique. Ces sciences pratiques s'appliquent à déterminer les moyens qui sont le plus souvent valables pour l'acquisition de la vertu, en quoi s'accomplit la loi naturelle. Ce genre de science, en effet, "ne vise pas à déterminer la nature de la vertu, mais le moyen à employer pour devenir vertueux, faute de quoi son utilité serait nulle."⁽¹⁾ Cependant, même la seule connaissance de ces moyens ne fait pas l'homme de bien; elle ne permet pas de savoir, à elle seule, comment agir hic et nunc. Elle rectifie sans doute l'intelligence dans la ligne du savoir pratique, mais ne rectifie pas pour autant l'appétit. La science morale, en effet, réside dans la seule raison (in sola ratione), tandis que la prudence, vertu architectonique de l'action, a quelque chose dans l'appétit.⁽²⁾ Or, celui-ci peut être plus ou moins droit.

Et nous voici en face de la plus grande difficulté de l'action droite : la vérité du jugement prudentiel, de la décision de faire ce qui est à faire hic et nunc, ne consiste pas dans la conformité de l'intelligence avec ce qui est; elle dépend essentiellement de la con-

(1) - Ethique à Nicomaque, II, 2, 1103b25.

(2) - S. Thomas, In VI Ethicor., lect. 7, n. 1200 : "...Prudentia non est in ratione solum, sed habet aliquid in appetitu. Omnia ergo de quibus hic fit mentio, in quantum sunt species prudentiae, in quantum non in ratione sola consistunt, sed habent aliquid in appetitu. In quantum enim sunt in sola ratione, dicuntur quaedam scientiae practicae, scilicet ethica oeconomica et politica."

formité de l'intelligence avec l'appétit rectifié. Du reste, la vérité spéculative concernant toutes les circonstances de l'action est impossible; elle ne peut porter que sur ce qui arrive le plus souvent. Cette connaissance spéculative des circonstances est suffisante pour l'action, mais ne suffit pas pour garantir la vérité prudentielle. Celle-ci dépend de la disposition de l'appétit : veut-on faire le bien, hic et nunc, tel qu'il doit être voulu ? Un homme peut savoir que l'on doit boire avec mesure, qu'il a coutume de boire à l'excès, que le moyen d'acquérir la vertu de sobriété est de s'abstenir; que pour être raisonnable il devrait, lui, s'abstenir hic et nunc; tout cela ne l'empêche pas de décider à commettre encore un excès. Malgré toute sa connaissance, son jugement prudentiel est faux, et d'est l'appétit concupiscible immodéré qui l'incline à porter ce jugement.

Plus encore dans les temps modernes que dans l'antiquité, des philosophes ont tenté de contourner surtout cette dernière difficulté de l'action droite, soit au moyen de la seule science, soit au moyen de l'art : moyens dont la connaissance et l'application devraient, d'une manière automatique, nous faire agir tel que la raison le demande. Aristote était d'un tout autre avis. Pour lui, comme pour saint Thomas, la science morale seule est peu utile à la vertu, tandis que le cas des arts est tout autre que celui des vertus.

...Le cas des arts n'est pas semblable à celui des vertus, car les oeuvres de l'art ont leur bonté en elles-mêmes, en sorte qu'il leur suffit d'être en elles-mêmes telles qu'elles doivent être. Mais dans le cas des vertus il ne suffit pas que les choses que l'on fait soient justes ou tempérées. Encore faut-il que l'agent agisse de la manière dont il doit agir.

Il faut, en premier lieu, qu'il agisse avec connaissance; ensuite que son acte provienne d'un choix fait en vue de cet acte lui-même; en troisième lieu que son action procède d'une disposition ferme et immuable. Ces conditions n'entrent pas en ligne de compte dans le cas des arts, sauf la connaissance. Mais dans le cas des vertus, la connaissance n'a que peu d'importance ou même n'en a pas du tout, tandis que les autres conditions ne sont nullement négligeables. Que dis-je ? Elles comptent pour tout, puisqu'elles ne s'obtiennent que par la pratique continue de ce qui est juste et de ce qui est tempérant. Or, on qualifie les actions de justes et de tempérées, quand elles sont telles que les accomplirait un homme juste et tempérant. En revanche, est juste et tempérant non pas celui qui fait ces choses, mais celui qui les fait de la manière dont les justes et les tempérants exécutent ces actions. [Car on pourrait faire comme les personnes tempérantes quand il n'y a pas assez à boire ou à manger.] On a donc raison de dire que c'est en posant des actes de justice que l'homme devient juste, et en posant des actes de tempérance que l'homme devient tempérant.

Faute de cette pratique, nul ne deviendra homme de bien. Mais la plupart des gens ne se donnent pas cette peine et, se réfugiant dans l'argumentation, croient pouvoir devenir d'honnêtes gens en faisant de la philosophie [des vertus], semblables en quelque sorte à ces malades qui, prêtant avec soin l'oreille aux prescriptions des médecins, ne se conforment pas à l'ordonnance. Et de même que ces derniers, ne retrouveront pas la santé en soignant leur corps de la sorte, de même les autres ne guériront pas non plus leur âme en philosophant de cette manière. (1)

(1) - Ethique à Nicomaque, II, 4, 1105b25-b20. — S. Thomas se fait sien cet enseignement, dans la Q. D. de Virtutibus in Communi, a. 6, ad 1 : "...Prudentia plus importat quam scientia practica : nam ad scientiam practicam pertinet universale iudicium de agendis; sicut fornicationem esse malam, furtum non esse faciendum, et huiusmodi. Quia quidem scientia existente, in particulari actu contingit iudicium rationis intercipi, ut non recte dijudicet; et propter hoc dicitur parum valere ad virtutem, quia ea existente contingit hominem contra virtutem peccare. Sed ad prudentiam pertinet recte iudicare de singulis agibilibus, prout sunt nunc agenda : quod quidem iudicium corrumpitur per quodlibet peccatum. Et ideo prudentia manente, homo non peccat : unde ipsa non parum sed multum confert ad virtutem; immo ipsam virtutem causat..."

Then we are held accountable for our actions,
the cause of which is still very confused.
Our friendships are uncertain. Things
rarely turn out the way we planned them -
and not necessarily through our fault.
And sometimes it is better so. Like when
I wanted to become a fireman.

The fact was all for the good that in
the state of original justice throughout
~~our whole~~ all wrong - which does
not mean that we ought to congratulate
our poor parents on this score.

We remain subject to the irrational
wiles of fortune or misfortune. We cannot
prevent all that may happen to what we
do. A good and proper action may in fact
result in catastrophe. We do not have
the knowledge of good and evil.

That is the mode of existence called
human. It is all very contingent - and
frequently and obviously absurd.

We all know that we must do the good & avoid evil.
We know that we must pay our debts.
There is a man who, on the appointed day, asks me to play him my debt?
Then I say it, then and there?
It is likely, but it cannot be quite certain.
Suppose I know he is going to use the money
to pay someone to throw up a picnic, killing all on hand.
It would be unwise to pay it then & now.
Who is it he just, how & how? To pay to each his due.
The difficulty is in the application of the law.

degraded positions :- Original corpus { missing
original

- Not distinguishable, but still intended
original to same - type.

~~Some say that photos are identical to each other.~~

Some held that our photos. vocabulary is purely
anthropomorphic because it terms objects
referred to things of human size - type. Is
the practical life - either making or doing.

Take the word 'matter'

"O God! Had we might and the book of fate
And see the revolutions of the times

..... C, if this were seen;
The happiest youth, viewing his progress through,
What perils past, what troubles to ensue,
Would should shut, and sit him
down and die."

II all Part of Henry IV.